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After joining NATO, Lithuania mobilized all its military capabilities to 
become a responsible partner of the Alliance, primarily by participating in 
expeditionary missions. The annexation of Crimea inspired the return of 
Lithuania’s security and defence policy to territorial defence. Conventional 
capacity building and tactics to combat hybrid threats have become key 
challenges for the national defence system. The first task was to find ways to 
increase Lithuania’s quantitative advantage over a potential aggressor, i.e., 
to strengthen deterrence by denial. Compulsory permanent initial military 
service was used to create an army reserve. In this context, the question 
arose as to whether the duty to the homeland should be performed out of love 
for it or simply because it is mandated. In fact, one of the direct expressions 
of love for the homeland may be willingness to defend one’s own country.
According to a 2019 representative public survey1, only 4.2 percent 
of the respondents strongly agreed that in the case of an armed attack 
Lithuania’s inhabitants should defend themselves and the state. In 2020, 
the number of respondents with this attitude rose to 8.4 percent. Even 
before the Covid-2019 pandemic, the reluctance of Lithuania’s inhabitants 
to express willingness to defend the state was the strongest of all the Baltic 
states, comparing the survey data of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 2019 
and 2020. Unlike in the case of Estonia,2 annual representative surveys 
using the same questionary to assess the willingness to defend one’s own 
country are not conducted in Lithuania. Consequently, it becomes difficult 
to draw general conclusions about the dynamics of the willingness to defend 
Lithuania. The most important problem encountered in analysing the results 
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of different surveys is not only that the wording of the question differs, but 
also that the surveys do not reveal the motives of those who do not want to 
contribute to Lithuania’s defence. The first part of the chapter is intended to 
discuss how willingness to defend one’s own state is measured in Lithuania. 
In the second part, the will to defend one’s state using a weapon is linked 
to the readiness to do so. It is assumed that in the case of armed resistance, 
the will alone is not enough, and skills are necessary to strengthen the will. 
The third part aims to briefly discuss the possible reasons why Lithuanians 
may lack the will to defend their state. What is not discussed in this chapter 
is no less important. How does belief in the capabilities of the military affect 
the will of the people to resist and the will to defend the state? How do public 
discourses about “small Lithuania” and “big hostile Russia” affect people’s 
belief that defending the country is not a case lost before it even began due 
to the asymmetry in military capabilities? And, most importantly, what will 
predict how the willingness to defend one’s state could become a real action? 
Since respondents are asked a hypothetical question whether they would 
defend the state, they provide a hypothetical answer. 
Who is willing to defend Lithuania?
In fact, the willingness of Lithuanians to defend their homeland is not a 
frequent object of sociological surveys. The Civil Society Institute “Civitas” 
(CSI) has been conducting a survey of the Civic empowerment index in 
Lithuania since 2007. After the annexation of Crimea, in 2014 and 2015 
the institute included a question in its annual surveys: “Of course, we all 
hope that there will be no more war, but if it would, would you defend your 
country?” To measure a change of the willingness to defend one’s country, 
the institute included data from the European Social Survey (ESS) (Table 1). 
According to the Civic power index of 2014 and 2015, the willingness to 
defend one’s country is related to one’s active participation in civil and 
political activities, inclination to contribute to solutions of various social 
problems, and belief that citizens have influence in society.3
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Of course, we all hope that there will be 












Yes 61 46 32 56,7 56
No 12 18 41 14,5 17
Don’t know 27 37 27 28,9 27
Table 1. Willingness to defend Lithuania according to polls included in the Civic 
empowerment index by the Civil Society Institute (Lithuania) (percent).4
In 2017, the results of the research project “Subjective Security in 
a Changing Geopolitical Context: Peculiarities, Forming Factors, and 
Strategies Developed by Individuals” were published. According to the 
survey included in the project, in 2016, only 49 percent of respondents were 
willing to defend Lithuania, while 34 percent of the respondents were not. 
The study showed that young men with military experience were more 
willing to defend their homeland. The authors of the study also made the 
assumption that pride in one’s state and patriotic attitudes may influence 
the will to defend Lithuania in the event of military aggression. The survey 
showed that 39 percent of the respondents were proud to be citizens of 
Lithuania and would go to defend their homeland in the event of war; 20 
percent of the respondents were not proud to be Lithuanians, but willing 
to defend their homeland, while 17 percent were proud, but not willing 
to defend one’s country due to their age, health status or other reasons. 
It is also necessary to mention that the results of the study indicate that 
patriotism is linked to specific actions in the event of war, i.e., less patriotic 
individuals in the case of war indicated a desire to emigrate, while patriotic-
minded individuals stated that they would seek to actively contribute to the 
country’s defence.5
In 2018 and 2020, a Sociological Survey of Media Preferences, Geopolitical 
Situation Assessment and Attitudes towards Threats was commissioned by 
the Ministry of National Defence and the Eastern Europe Studies Centre 
(EESC). The survey was based on the same assumption — pride in one’s state 
and patriotic attitudes may influence the willingness to defend one’s state. 
However, the report on the conducted survey includes just one illustrated 
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example, that the respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the 
statement: “Unable to resist with weapon, I would contribute to the defence 
of the country in other way” (Table 2). For some reason the willingness of 
the respondents to contribute to the defence of homeland with a weapon 
was mentioned as if by the way without providing clear data with figures: 
“32% of the respondents said they would contribute to the country’s defence 
with a weapon if needed: compared to 2018, the change in these numbers 
were not statistically significant”6. Meanwhile, in 2018, only 24 percent of 
the respondents were inclined to contribute to armed resistance in case 
of war.7 Whether the population’s higher level of willingness to engage in 
peaceful civic resistance is related to personal attitudes or simply to a lack 
of knowledge on how to use a weapon remains open.
Year Statement Totally agree










Proud to be 
citizens of 
Lithuania




would resist in 
another way 
18 30 19 13 14 6
2020
Proud to be 
citizens of 
Lithuania




would resist in 
another way 
21 37 17 8 14 3
Table 2. Comparison of being proud in Lithuanian citizenship and willingness to 
participate in civic resistance in 2018 and 2020 (surveys ordered by the ministry of 
National Defence and the Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Lithuania)) (percent).8
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The most comprehensive study of the willingness to defend the homeland 
titled “Who would go to defend Lithuania? Assumptions and possibilities of 
civic resistance” was published in 2018. According to the results of a public 
survey conducted in 2017, 42.2 percent answered positively to the question 
“Of course, we all hope that there will be no more war, but if it arises, 
would you personally contribute to Lithuania’s defence?” 25.2 percent of the 
respondents did not express the will to defend the homeland, and 29.9 said 
they did not know. 3 percent of the respondents indicated that they would take 
the initiative to organize the resistance and 36 percent of the respondents 
would contribute to it, although as many as 32 percent would not contribute, 
and 29 percent did not know how they would behave in the case of armed 
attack.9 A lack of knowledge and skills can lead people to declare they do not 
know whether they will defend their homeland in the event of war. One thing 
is to have a particular set of skills and decide not to use it, another thing is to 
actually have no clue what to do in case of military attack.
Since 2018, the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania commissions 
public surveys to assess public trust in the army and willingness to defend 
the homeland.10 The results of the survey are included in the Annual Activity 
Reports of the Ministry. According to the surveys, in 2018, 47 percent of the 
respondents were willing to defend one’s homeland, while 34 percent were 
unwilling, and 19 percent were undecided. The number of the willing to 
defend Lithuania is slowly increasing (48.5 percent in 2019 and 49 percent 
in 2020).11 The goal in 2021 is to reach 52 percent of the citizens willing 
to defend the homeland. As in 2018, the Minister of National Defence 
Raimundas Karoblis stated: “A strong army is unimaginable without public 
support. Growing public support for the Armed Forces and determination 
to protect the Homeland if it is threatened is directly related to the ongoing 
modernization of the Armed Forces and the growing public awareness of 
emerging threats and the information impact of hostile forces.”12 The Annual 
Reports include just a percentage share of Lithuania’s citizens willing to 
defend the country, whereas data on unwilling or ignorant citizens are not 
provided. Thus, there is no possibility to determine whether the number of 
those who are not willing to defend their state is decreasing or increasing. It 
also remains unclear what proportion of the population would contribute to 
peaceful resistance and how many would be willing and able to contribute 
to armed resistance.
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Who is ready to defend Lithuania?
Article 139 of Lithuania’s constitution defines that “The defence of the State 
of Lithuania against a foreign armed attack shall be the right and duty of 
each citizen of the Republic of Lithuania. The citizens of the Republic of 
Lithuania must perform military or alternative national defence service 
according to the procedure established by law.”13 The duty to defend was 
defined by two basic forms: an initial period of mandatory military service 
(12 months duration) and alternative national defence service. Alternative 
types of service included Leadership courses, basic military training 
programme, studies at the Military Academy of Lithuania, and volunteer 
service in the national defence volunteer forces.14 
In 2008, the Lithuanian government decided to change the mixed army 
recruitment model to a professional army, even though conscripts made up 
about 75 percent of the battalions’ contingent at that time. Accordingly, the 
abolition of compulsory initial military service had far-reaching negative 
consequences, i.e., when Russia annexed Crimea, the full staffing of 
different units in Lithuania ranged from 18 to 72 percent.15 Thus, in 2015, 
it was decided to return the conscription duty (nine months of mandatory 
service) as a matter of urgency. The decision had two main objectives: to 
fill army units and to prepare a reserve.16 At first, the conscription age was 
19—26 years, however, in 2019, the draftees age group was changed to 
18—23 years. 
When the Lithuanian Parliament urgently decided in 2015 to return to the 
conscript model, which was abandoned in 2008, the slogan began to spread 
among young people: “Everyone has the right to not kill.”17 This illustrates 
that a country’s defence may have two connotations. The first is that people 
are not willing to contribute to the defence of the country because they want 
to stay alive (desire to survive). The second is that they don’t want to defend 
the state because they don’t want to take the life of another. 
A photo project “They Won the Lottery” was soon presented to the public. 
Fourteen portraits of crying men and their insights into masculinity and 
conscript army18 in Lithuania received condemnation in the public space 
for the reluctance of young men to perform their duties to the homeland. 
Some influential people called the photo project an “insightful, ideological, 
intellectual, attractive and extremely beautiful betrayal of the state.”19 In 
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response to the project, members of the Estonian National Defence League, a 
voluntary national defence organization, presented a photo project “Without 
Tears”, which sought to demonstrate that people living in the small Baltic 
states need to protect their “beloved freedom”20. Nevertheless, according to 
the public opinion poll, 68 percent of the respondents supported the return 
of the conscript army, and only 26 percent of the respondents opposed the 
decision.21 Moreover, in 2016, 81 percent of the respondents believed that 
mandatory military service is beneficial for young people, 12 percent of the 
respondents indicated the opposite.22
In 2015, 36825 draftees were selected by a random electronic selection 
system, i.e., won the lottery. Of these, 3000 were scheduled to be called up 
for service that year (Table 3). Draftees could choose:
1. to perform the service voluntarily, although they were not included in 
the lists of conscripts of that year (conscripts volunteers);
2. to perform the service without requesting a postponement of the 
service time (conscripts in order of priority).
 Category 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Planned number of conscripts 3000 3000 3537 3827 3827 3828
Voluntary requests (have not 
been included in the list of 
conscripts for a calendar year 
and who have expressed a 
wish to perform the service)
2859 3085 2914 2963 2749 2725
Share of all requests for 
compulsory military service 
received that year
71% 63% 50% 42% 40% 39%
Priority requests (draftees on 
the list of conscripts for a cal-
endar year who have expressed 
a wish to perform the service)
1170 1789 2865 4113 4084 4245
Share of all requests for 
compulsory military service 
received that year 
29% 37% 50% 58% 60% 61%
Table 3. Assessment of conscripts’ request to serve in the Lithuanian Armed Forces in 
2015—2020.23 
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3010 soldiers started permanent mandatory initial military service for 
nine months, of which 2133 young people were volunteers and 877 were 
conscripts who expressed a desire to serve in order of priority.24 
According to statistical data provided by the National Military 
Conscription and Recruitment Service, the nature of requests for compulsory 
military service began to change (Figure 1). The share of the draftees that 
were on the list of conscripts for the calendar year and expressed their will 
to be conscripted on the priority basis has increased from 29 percent in 2015 
up to 61 percent in 2020. This indicates that in many cases young people 
are not unwilling to perform compulsory service, but rather they want to 
anticipate and plan it.
Figure 1. Dynamics of conscripts serving in the Lithuanian Armed Forces in 2015—2020.25
Motivation for compulsory military service is supported by paying 
allowances to soldiers. Not only each soldier is being paid 148 Eur monthly to 
cover household expenses, but also solders are getting cumulative payment 
after the service period based upon the military service performance level 
(Table 4). The payment for a volunteer soldier is increased by 30 percent and 
for a soldier who has been called up for service and expressed a desire to be 







2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Volunteers (conscripts who have not been included in the list of conscripts for a calendar year and who have 
expressed a wish to perform the service)
Priority (conscripts on the list of conscripts for a calendar year who have expressed a wish to perform the service)
Mandatory (conscripts on the list of conscripts for a calendar year who are called up for mandatory service)
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Evaluation of service 
performance Compulsorily called On priority basis Volunteer
Excellent 160 184 208
Good 120 138 156
Satisfactory 80 92 104
Table 4. Allowances paid (EUR) to solders based on their service performance level.26 
The conscription allowance system was designed not only to increase 
young people’s motivation to perform mandatory military service, but also 
to compensate for possible financial losses they experience when they leave 
the labour market. However, the continuing desire to perform the military 
service on voluntary or on priority basis cannot be explained by financial 
incentives alone. 
In fact, it is necessary to mention that the analysis of young people’s 
motivation to perform permanent compulsory primary military service in 
2016 and 2017 shows that up to 63 percent of those who wanted to perform 
the service stated that they would serve even without reward. Based on the 
results of the study, it can be argued that the main reason for wanting to 
serve is to learn to protect one’s family and homeland. Also, two important 
stimuli can be identified: the real potential of the threat of attack and 
previous experience in military organizations. Thus, at the beginning of 
service, 81 percent of conscripts were willing to defend the homeland in the 
case of armed attack, while at the end of service the number of those willing 
to defend Lithuania with a weapon decreased to 71 percent.27 Such annual 
conscript surveys should help to identify the reasons for the decline in the 
will to defend one’s country.
Volunteers form a significant part of the Lithuanian Armed Forces 
(Table 5). Although serving in the National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) 
is an alternative form to mandatory military service, the decision of most 
volunteers is based on patriotic or lifestyle motives. 
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Category 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Professionals 8146 8660 9400 10173 10729 11168 11428










211 211 209 210 217 263 295
Total 15945 16506 18019 19062 19783 20073 20711
Table 5. Lithuania’s national defence system’s personnel size (2015—2021).28
* Planned.
According to the complex sociological research study “Motivation to 
Serve in the Lithuanian army”, published in 2015, 81 percent of the volunteer 
soldiers stated that they joined the NDVF because they wanted to defend 
their homeland in the case of a threat and were driven by patriotic feelings. 
Additionally, 94 percent of the soldiers stated they wanted to experience 
adventure and challenges, while 72 percent indicated that they wanted to 
spend their free time in a worthwhile way. However, only 64 percent of the 
volunteers were certain that they would go to war to defend Lithuania and 
28 percent indicated that they would probably go to war, while 8 percent 
were undecided or stated that they would not defend their own country. The 
latter were younger and had less experience, so some of them were simply 
not convinced they had enough training and skills.29 Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to determine whether the reasons for serving in the NDVF have 
changed during the last six years, as continuous sociological research on 
this topic is not being conducted.
Other factual evidence of increasing citizens’ willingness to participate 
in national defence is the activities of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union. 
According to the Law of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, the Union is a 
voluntary, self-governing civil society organization that strengthens the 
68
state’s defence capabilities and develops defence educational activities. 
Although the Union’s main objective is to prepare for non-violent civil 
resistance and armed national defence, it also promotes trust in national 
institutions and public spirit. In case of war the Riflemen’s combat units 
shall carry out the defence tasks assigned by the command of Lithuania’s 
armed forces.30 Before the Russia—Ukraine war, the Union united about 
7,000  members, and since 2015, the number of members has exceeded 
10,000 (Table 6).
Category 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Riflemen 3834 4443 4514 4645 5277 5116
Young Riflemen (age 11—18) 5426 6314 5910 5880 5910 5021
Total 9260 10757 10424 10525 11187 10137
Table 6. Dynamics of change of members of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union in  
2015—2020 according to the Union’s annual reports.31
The union experienced its hour of glory in 2014, when the country’s 
political leaders began to recognize the importance of the Riflemen in 
increasing the state’s defence capabilities.32 In the context of Russia’s 
aggression against Ukraine, in 2014 alone, more than 800 volunteers joined 
the union, including many famous and popular people. The call to “become 
a rifleman to defend the homeland” was effective. It must be borne in mind 
that this effect may have been temporary, i.e., caused by a sense of threat and 
mobilization of patriotism due to the annexation of Crimea. For the effect to 
be lasting, it is necessary to identify the reasons for one’s unwillingness to 
participate in the defence of the state. 
Why wouldn’t someone defend Lithuania?
If we were to evaluate the results of the different national public opinion 
polls discussed in this chapter, we would have to admit that, in the event of 
war, Lithuanian citizens would be the least willing of all the Baltic states 
to defend their country. Moreover, as the questions in these surveys differ, 
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with some placing more emphasis on armed defence and others simply on 
defence, it is difficult to say that respondents would defend Lithuania using 
weapons rather than by resisting peacefully.
The theoretical framework of willingness to defend one’s country is 
based on a couple of assumptions.33 In the case of Lithuania, compulsory 
military service did not have a decisive effect, as the vast majority of 
conscripts choose to perform their service voluntarily or in order of priority. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, most of the society supports compulsory 
military service and even sees it as beneficial to young people. 
In 2018, parliamentary parties signed an agreement on Lithuanian 
defence policy guidelines. Decisions on the possibility of introducing 
universal military service was scheduled for 2022.34 It is not known when 
the final decision on the universal military service will be made, but the 
Minister of National Defence Arvydas Anušauskas confirmed that, due 
to the poor demographic situation, the universal military service will be 
inevitable.35 How this can change the general tendency of willingness to 
defend the state, so far can only be speculated.
Previously discussed studies suggested that those proud of their 
citizenship are more likely to participate in civic resistance.36 According to 
surveys, in 2020, 62 percent of respondents were proud to be Lithuanian, 
but only 49 percent said they were willing to defend Lithuania. Lack of pride 
in Lithuanian citizenship, lost sense of duty to defend one’s state and low 
trust in political institutions were also mentioned in the 2018 monograph 
“Who would go to defend Lithuania? Civic resistance assumptions and 
possibilities”37. Although comparing the data of different surveys, from 
2018 to 2020, the share of the population being proud citizens of Lithuania 
increased by 4 percent, unfortunately the share of those willing to defend 
the state increased just by 2 percent. One might argue that survey data is 
not reflecting reality, because people of other nationalities also are citizens 
of Lithuania and maybe their national identity is stronger than feeling of 
political association with the political entity.
In fact, ethnic Lithuanians are the dominant majority in Lithuania and 
make up more than 85 percent of the population (Figure 2). At the same 
time, the largest ethnic community consists of Poles (almost 6 percent of the 
population) and Russians (less than 5 percent of the population). Analysis 
of data from a representative public survey38 shows that the proportion of 
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Lithuanians certainly not willing to defend Lithuania remained the same 
(19.4 percent), while the proportion of Russians who certainly would 
not contribute to the country’s defence decreased from 20.1 percent 
to 9.4 percent. The share of Russian respondents who said they would 
defend Lithuania in 2019 was 26.8 percent, and in 2020 only 16.3 percent 
declared willingness to defend the state. However, in the 2019 survey, the 
demographic indicator is the language spoken in the family and only two 
are mentioned (Lithuanian and Russian). In the 2020 survey, the indicator is 
nationality and there are already three categories (Lithuanian, Russian and 
other). It can be assumed that the majority of respondents who declared their 
nationality to be ‘other’ are representatives of the Polish ethnic community, 
as this community is the most numerous in Lithuania. Thus, in 2020, as 
many as 63.9 percent of respondents of other nationalities could not answer 
whether would they defend the state, while 14.1 percent of the respondents 
were willing to defend Lithuania. 
Figure 2. Proportion of population by nationality in relation to the total number of 
permanent residents.39












2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
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Virgilijus Rutkauskas in his 2018 publication assessed individual data from 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and concluded that citizens of the Baltic states 
who lack trust in national governmental institutions or army demonstrate 
less willingness to defend one’s own country.40 According to the data of a 
representative public opinion poll in the Baltic states in 2020, 41 percent of 
respondents in Lithuania trust the government, and only 24 percent trust the 
parliament. In Latvia, 30 percent of respondents trust the government and 
28 percent trust the parliament. In Estonia, on the other hand, 53 percent of 
respondents trust the government and 51 percent trust the parliament.41 Thus, the 
main task should be to increase the trust in political institutions and democracy 
to increase the willingness of the population to defend their homeland.
It is true that when comparing public confidence in the army with trust 
in other institutions, such as the Lithuanian parliament, government or 
justice system, the army is the most trusted national institution (Figure 3). 
According to Eurobarometer surveys, Lithuania’s public trust in the army 
since 2015 has ranged between 70 and 80 percent. The peak of confidence 
was reached in the summer of 2020, and in 2021, 78 percent of the 
respondents expressed their trust in the army. 
Figure 3. Trust of Lithuania’s citizens in national institutions according to Eurobarometer 
surveys.42 
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It is important to mention that, according to the results of surveys 
conducted by national public opinion research companies which are 
included in the annual reports of the Ministry of National Defence, trust 
in the army in September 2021 was 64 percent and almost 11 percent 
distrusted Lithuania’s armed forces (Table 7).
Tend to trust (annual average) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
According to the national 
public opinion research 
companies
54 56 58 60 62 66*
According to Eurobarometer 71 74 75 77 79 78*
Table 7. Dynamics of public trust in the Lithuanian army (percent).43
*Estimated average.
According to Lithuanian National Anti-Poverty Network, in 2020, 
585  thousand people lived below the at-risk of poverty line. It means that 
almost 21 percent of the population received only 430 Eur income per month 
for one person or 904 Eur for a family with two children under 14 years old. 
Income inequality in Lithuania is one of the largest in the European Union. 
It is true that income inequality is declining. In 2015, the income level of 
20 percent of the richest and 20 percent of the poorest people in Lithuania 
differed 7.5 times, in 2020 the difference was 6.1 times.44 Comparing the Baltic 
states income inequality, Latvia and Lithuania rank among the highest in the 
EU,45 however, to determine whether income inequality is a decisive factor in 
why the willingness to defend one’s country is higher in Estonia and lower 
in Lithuania and Latvia, long-term comparative studies should be conducted 
based not only on public survey data but also on qualitative research methods.
Conclusions
In 2015, the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania updated the Strategy 
of preparing the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania for state defence. The 
strategy defines that an integrated system of civic preparation must have two 
complementary elements: the nation’s determination to fight for the country’s 
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independence and resist the aggressor in every possible way, and certain 
knowledge and practical skills required for both civil and armed defence. 
Consequently, one of the main goals of the strategy was to provide two types 
of knowledge to Lithuania’s citizens. Firstly, military training. Secondly, 
knowledge and skills required to participate in civilian resistance.46 The 
surveys discussed earlier illustrate that the experience gained in military 
organizations has a positive effect on the willingness to defend one’s state. 
In general, the greater the number of organizations in which a person 
participates, the greater the willingness to participate in resistance in the 
event of war.47 However, for the resistance to be universal and armed, it is 
necessary to nationally cultivate the military training of young people.
Five years later, the Ministry of National Defence announced a 
draft Strategy of preparing the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania for 
civil resistance, which includes an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats. The main identified weakness is the lack 
of knowledge of citizens about participation in state defence and civil 
resistance.48 This indicates that prior strategy was not successfully 
implemented. Moreover, it is noticed that only 50 percent of citizens would 
be willing to be involved in the country’s defence and civil resistance. At the 
same time, in public schools, optional modules dedicated to national defence 
are not popular among students. The main threats to civil resistance that are 
defined in the Draft Strategy is a lack of trust in parliament and government, 
low participation in public organizations and civic activities. The main task 
defined in the Strategy is to introduce values that would promote citizens’ 
identification with the state and patriotism, and willingness to defend one’s 
state.49 Does this mean that Lithuanian citizens are the most unpatriotic of 
all the Baltic states and can this explain the lack of willingness to defend the 
state? In addition, it remains unclear how success will be measured. Would 
60 or 70 percent of the population willing to defend Lithuania be enough? 
Perhaps the explanation for why Lithuanians are the least willing of all 
the Baltic states to defend their state is simpler. The message about threats 
is not being clearly articulated, i.e., it is too abstract just to announce 
that Russia is posing a military threat to Lithuania. As long as people are 
bombarded with discourses of hybrid threats or attacks without a clear 
plan of action for what they could do in their personal lives to contribute 
to national security, it is doubtful that a mere spread of values will make 
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any difference. Knowing that one has a duty to contribute to a country’s 
defence must be based on an understanding of what is threatening the 
country and how specifically it should be acted upon. Another explanation 
is that the message is not reaching the target group. For instance, in 2020, 
the Department of Mobilization and Civil Resistance under the Ministry 
of National Defence issued “The Alphabet of Civil Resistance: Tips for 
Combating Without Weapons.” Only the Lithuanian radio and television 
reported on this publication. Not even one popular internet news site 
informed about the importance of this publication in the educational or civil 
society building process. The publicity of the book was not universal, i.e., no 
social networks, influencers or other modern means of communication were 
used to substantiate its importance for the public. Consequently, one may 
argue that Lithuania’s citizens live in a false sense of existential security. 
Distrust of state institutions and media, especially during the Covid-19 
pandemic, further encourages the population to question all messages that 
the government is trying to send. In this case, a reliable intermediary must 
be used for successful communication. The Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union or 
the National Defence Volunteer Forces could play a greater role not only in 
informing the population, but also in promoting a sense of duty build on the 
motto “the one is not worthy of freedom, who does not protect it”.
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